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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued a landmark 
decision that preserves the state’s recreational trails and promotes 
the multiple use and conversion of inactive rail corridors.  In State 
v. Hess,1 the court held that certain portions of the Paul Bunyan 
State Trail did not revert to the abutting property owners once the 
railroad line on which the trail was constructed ceased to be used 
for railroad purposes.2  The court concluded that an 1898 deed 
conveying land to a railroad company “for Right of Way and for 
Railway purposes” conveyed a fee simple determinable rather than 
an easement and that the state’s Marketable Title Act3 (MTA) 
extinguished the reversionary right.4  In turning back the property 
owners’ claims, the court reaffirmed its longstanding approach that 
the intent of the grantor determines the nature and scope of the 
interest conveyed and refused to create a presumption that a 
conveyance to a railroad is an easement rather than a defeasible 
fee.  Hess reassures the state that it has good title to other corridors 
previously acquired from railroads and stems the tide of property 
owners’ claims that threaten the state’s contiguous trail system.  
Hess, however, leaves for another day the question of whether 
recreational trail use is within the scope of an easement for railroad 
purposes under the shifting public use doctrine articulated in 
Washington Wildlife Preservation, Inc. v. Minnesota,5 the nation’s 
seminal case addressing this issue. 
This article assesses the significance of Hess for Minnesota’s 
recreational trail system and the conversion of rails to trails.  Part II 
describes the legal context within which Hess was decided, with 
particular emphasis on the methodology of constructing ancient 
deeds to railroads and the public policy underlying the MTA.6  Part 
III sets forth the facts giving rise to the Hess decision and details the 
approach adopted by the court of appeals—an approach which, if 
affirmed by the supreme court, would have facilitated a parcel by 
 
 1. 684 N.W.2d 414 (Minn. 2004). 
 2. Id. at 427. 
 3. MINN. STAT. § 541.023 (2002). 
 4. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 426-27. 
 5. 329 N.W.2d 543 (Minn. 1983). 
 6. See infra Part II. 
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parcel attack on the state’s ownership of its recreational trails and 
potentially limited the application of the shifting public use 
doctrine established in Washington Wildlife.7  Part IV discusses the 
supreme court’s analysis of the issues, its interpretative 
methodology, and the normative justification of its approach.8  Part 
V concludes that Hess establishes a strong legal and policy 
foundation for the past and future conversion of rail corridors into 
recreational trails, promotes the public interest, and avoids 
plunging the state into a costly parcel by parcel battle to save its 
contiguous recreational trail system.9 
II. THE LEGAL CONTEXT WITHIN WHICH HESS WAS DECIDED 
The question before the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. 
Hess was a technical question of deed construction: whether an 
1898 deed to a railroad company conveyed a fee simple 
determinable or an easement.10  A fee simple determinable is an 
ownership interest in real property subject to the limitation that the 
property reverts to the grantor upon the occurrence of a specified 
event.11  By contrast, an easement is a right to the use or enjoyment 
of the land rather than an ownership interest in the property 
itself.12 
In evaluating the nature of the property interest conveyed by 
the 1898 deed, the supreme court had the opportunity to create a 
rule of construction that a deed to a railroad was an easement 
rather than a defeasible fee.  This was the course taken by the court 
of appeals.13  Had the supreme court adopted such an approach, it 
would have opened the door to countless quiet title suits by 
landowners adjacent to inactive rail corridors.  Such an approach 
also would have been in tension with the shifting public use 
doctrine and would have facilitated ownership challenges of the 
state’s efforts to build a system of recreational trails on former rail 
corridors.  Consequently, State v. Hess was a highly salient case with 
 
 7. See infra Part III. 
 8. See infra Part IV. 
 9. See infra Part V. 
 10. State v. Hess, 684 N.W.2d 414, 420 (Minn. 2004). 
 11. Consol. Sch. Dist. No. 102 v. Walter, 243 Minn. 159, 161-63, 66 N.W.2d 
881, 883-84 (1954). 
 12. Id. 
 13. State ex rel Dept. of Nat’l Resources v. Hess, 665 N.W.2d 560, 566 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 2003). 
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significance extending far beyond the rights of the individual 
property owners involved in the dispute over the Paul Bunyan State 
Trail. 
This section discusses the legal context within which Hess was 
decided and sets the stage for understanding what was at stake in 
Hess.  Part A explains the methodology of construing ancient deeds 
to railroads.14  Part B discusses the influence of the history of 
railroad acquisition practices on the methodology of deed 
construction.15  Part C explains Minnesota’s prior case law 
regarding the interpretation of conveyances to railroad 
companies.16 Part D sets forth the provisions of the MTA, the 
statute’s underlying public policy goals, and how those goals might 
inform the court’s choice of interpretative methodology in Hess.17 
A. The Methodology of Deed Construction 
The nature and scope of the property rights granted to 
railroads by deeds executed in the 1800s is a recurring question in 
modern property jurisprudence.18  Historically, railroads could 
acquire a fee simple absolute, a fee simple subject to a condition 
subsequent, a fee simple determinable, a perpetual or unlimited 
easement, a limited or conditional easement, or a license.19  
Evaluating the precise nature of the interest conveyed by a 
particular deed, however, is a difficult task.  Ancient deeds are 
often ambiguous and may contain language appearing to grant 
both a fee estate and an easement.20  Discerning the parties’ intent 
is difficult because the parties are unavailable and there is limited, 
if any, extrinsic evidence regarding intent.21  In addition, the nature 
of the land at issue may be different than it was at the time the 
deed was executed.22  Further, state property laws may have 
different requirements governing the methodology of deed 
 
 14. See infra Part II.A. 
 15. See infra Part II.B. 
 16. See infra Part II.C. 
 17. See infra Part II.D. 
 18. See A.E. Korpela, Annotation, Deed To Railroad Company as Conveying Fee or 
Easement, 6 A.L.R.3d 973, § 3 (1966); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: 
SERVITUDES § 2.2 (2000). 
 19. See Korpela, supra note 18; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES 
§ 2.2 (2000). 
 20. Korpela, supra note 18. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
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interpretation.23 For all these reasons, there is considerable conflict 
in the way courts construe the nature and scope of the property 
interest conveyed to a railroad by deeds containing language 
referring to a “right-of-way” and/or the purpose of the 
conveyance.24 
Despite the conflicting outcomes reached by the courts, the 
polestar of deed interpretation is to effectuate the intent of the 
parties as expressed in the deed and in light of the surrounding 
circumstances.25  When a deed is ambiguous on the issue of intent, 
a court may consider parol evidence to determine the parties’ 
intent.26  The factors typically examined by the courts in evaluating 
the intent of the parties include: (1) the stated purpose of the 
grant, (2) whether the grantor reserved the right to use any of the 
land at issue, (3) the amount of consideration, (4) subsequent 
deeds identifying the nature of the original grant, and (5) the 
release of dower rights.27 
When the grant is described as a “right of way,” the intent of 
the parties is unclear regarding the nature of the grant because, as 
the United States Supreme Court has recognized, the term can 
refer to both (1) “a right of passage over any tract” or (2) the “land 
which railroad companies take upon which to construct their road-
bed.”28  Accordingly, the use of the term “right of way” does not 
 
 23. Jeffrey M. Heftman, Note, Railroad Right-of-Way Easements, Utility 
Apportionments, and Shifting Technological Realities, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1401, 1407 
(2002) (“The varying histories of state property law doctrine and the absence of 
federal preemption in the field account, in part, for the current diversity of 
treatment of such cases.”). 
 24. Id. 
 25. State v. Hess, 684 N.W.2d 414, 423 (Minn. 2004). 
 26. Id.; see also Farnes v. Lane, 281 Minn. 222, 225-26 & n.7, 161 N.W.2d 297, 
300 & n.7 (1968); 15 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST, Deeds § 1.11 (4th ed. 1992); Korpela, 
supra note 18. 
 27. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 423-26. 
 28. Id. at 424 (citing Joy v. City of St. Louis, 138 U.S. 1, 44 (1891); Bosell v. 
Rannestad, 226 Minn. 413, 418, 33 N.W.2d 40, 43-44 (1948)).  Other courts have 
recognized the two meanings of “right of way” and have concluded that the mere 
presence of the term “right of way” in a deed does not by itself indicate an intent 
to convey an easement.  See, e.g., King County v. Rasmussen, 299 F.3d 1077, 1085 
(9th Cir. 2002); Clark v. CSX Transp., Inc., 737 N.E.2d 752, 758 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2000); Brown v. State, 924 P.2d 908, 914 (Wash. 1996).  In addition, the fact that 
the term “right of way” is used in the habendum clause does not mean that an 
easement was conveyed.  In general, the habendum clause may explain, enlarge, 
or qualify, but it cannot contradict or defeat the estate granted in the granting 
clause.  New York Indians v. United States, 170 U.S. 1, 20 (1898); Clark, 737 N.E.2d 
at 758. 
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necessarily mean that the conveyance is an easement.29  When the 
grantor reserves the right to use any of the land at issue, such 
reservation is an indicator that the parties intended to convey an 
easement.30  If a deed is ambiguous, the courts will look to 
subsequent deeds describing the conveyance at issue to discern the 
parties’ intent.31  Because an easement is not title to the land and 
can be conveyed without the relinquishment of the wife’s dower 
rights, the release of dower rights may indicate that the parties 
intended to grant a fee estate.32 
Some courts view nominal consideration as an indicator that 
the parties intended to convey an easement rather than a fee 
simple determinable.  When the record does not establish the 
consideration typically paid for easements as opposed to fee simple 
estates, it cannot be ascertained whether the nominal consideration 
represented the value of an easement or a defeasible fee.33  In fact, 
in some cases, railroads often paid significant amounts of money 
for both easements and fee estates.34  In other cases, railroads 
sometimes paid nothing for fee estates because of the benefits to 
the grantor in having access to the railroad.  The Minnesota 
Supreme Court has observed that the difference in value of an 
easement and a fee simple determinable is nominal35 because 
railroad easements have the “substantiality of the fee,” in that the 
railroad has exclusive possession and control of the property 
subject only to the owner’s servient interest.36  Accordingly, 
nominal consideration does not necessarily indicate that the parties 
intended to convey an easement rather than a defeasible fee.37 
 
 29. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 424. 
 30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.2 (2000). 
 31. See, e.g., Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 424. 
 32. Id. at 425; see also Brewer & Taylor Co. v. Wall, 769 S.W.2d 753, 755 (Ark. 
1989); Coleman v. Mo. Pac. R.R.  Co., 745 S.W.2d 622, 637 (Ark. 1988); Elton 
Schmidt & Sons Farm Co. v. Kneib, 507 N.W.2d 305, 309 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993).  
But see Hawk v. Rice, 325 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Iowa 1982) (holding that granting 
clause clearly indicated conveyance of easement despite the release of dower in 
the deed). 
 33. King County, 299 F.3d at 1085 n.8. 
 34. Roeder Co. v. K & E Moving & Storage Co., 4 P.3d 839, 842-43 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2000). 
 35. Chi. Great W. Ry. Co. v. Zahner, 145 Minn. 312, 316-17, 177 N.W. 350, 
351-52 (1920). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See King County, 299 F.3d at 1084 & n.8; Brown v. State, 924 P.2d 908, 914 
(Wash. 1996); Roeder, 4 P.3d at 842. 
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B. The Influence of Railroad Acquisition Practices on Deed Construction 
Although the history of railroad acquisition practices is beyond 
the scope of this article,38 how the courts construe the nature and 
scope of a railroad’s property interest must be understood against 
the backdrop of this history.  During the heyday of railroad 
development and expansion, the railroads received tremendous 
federal and state government land grants, subsidies, and eminent 
domain powers to establish rail corridors.39  Landowners, eager to 
obtain the benefits of being connected to a rail corridor and higher 
land values, would often make an outright donation of land to the 
railroad.40  In other cases, landowners would sell the land, or an 
interest in the land, to the railroad.41  If a landowner refused to give 
up land necessary to complete a line, eminent domain powers were 
used to acquire the land.42  Often the land was being surveyed and 
the corridor was being constructed before land acquisition was 
finalized.43  Some rail lines were in operation years before land 
acquisition was finalized.44  Occasionally, no deed conveyed the 
property and the railroad’s interest was acquired through 
prescription. 
The haste and recklessness of this expansion ended in the 
1870s as the great rewards promised by the railroads failed to 
materialize, the abusive practices of the railroads were exposed, 
and huge land grants given to the railroads were increasingly 
viewed as government pork at the expense of the taxpayers.45  The 
backlash against the railroads from the 1880s to the 1920s resulted 
in many states reducing the railroads’ eminent domain powers, 
legislatively prohibiting railroads from acquiring land in fee simple, 
and legislatively mandating the abandonment of railroad 
 
 38. For further information regarding the history of railroad land acquisition, 
see Danaya C. Wright &  Jeffrey M. Hester, Pipes, Wires, and Bicycles: Rails-to-Trails, 
Utility Licenses, and the Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements from the Nineteenth to the 
Twenty-First Centuries, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351 (2000); Heftman, supra note 23; Emily 
Drumm, Note, Addressing the Flaws of the Rails-to-Trails Act, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
158 (1999); Gregg H. Hirakawa, Comment, Preserving Transportation Corridors for the 
Future:  Another Look at Railroad Deeds in Washington State, 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 481 
(2001). 
 39. Wright & Hester, supra note 38, at 366-78. 
 40. Id. at 369-70. 
 41. Id. at 370. 
 42. Id. at 370-71. 
 43. Id. at 371. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 374. 
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easements when a railroad did not continue to operate and 
maintain its corridors.46 
The public sentiment against the railroads also affected how 
courts interpreted deeds to railroad companies.  Many courts, 
reflecting this anti-railroad animus, abandoned the practice of 
making fine distinctions among various types of property rights the 
railroads could acquire.47  Instead, courts now resolved ambiguities 
and presumptions in deeds in favor of grantor landowners.48  The 
result, as Wright and Hester explain, was that the courts imposed a 
binary structure on railroad title disputes permitting a railroad to 
have either a fee simple absolute or an easement: 
The result was that many courts simply imposed a 
binary structure on railroad title disputes: either the 
railroad acquired fee simple absolute title, allowing it 
to do virtually anything it wanted with its land, even if it 
had discontinued services and abandoned certain 
parcels, or the railroad acquired merely an easement 
or a right-of-way over the original landowner’s land, 
extinguishable under principles of abandonment.49 
The methodology of deed construction and common law property 
doctrines and presumptions reflected this binary structure. 
C. Minnesota’s Methodology of Deed Interpretation on the Eve of Hess 
 On the eve of Hess, the Minnesota Supreme Court had clearly 
established that in determining the nature and scope of a 
conveyance, one examines the intent of the grantor, as expressed 
in the deed and in light of the surrounding circumstances.50  
Whether the court had established a binary structure of deed 
interpretation, however, was another matter.  Before Hess, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court had decided three cases addressing the 
nature of a right-of-way conveyance to a railroad company— 
Chambers v. Great Northern Power Co.,51 Norton v. Duluth Transfer 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 377. 
 48. Id. at 374-75. 
 49. Id. at 377. 
 50. Chi. Great W. Ry. Co. v. Zahner, 145 Minn. 312, 313-14, 177 N.W. 350, 
350 (1920); Norton v. Duluth Transfer Ry. Co., 129 Minn. 126, 130-31, 151 N.W. 
907, 907-08 (1915). 
 51. 100 Minn. 214, 110 N.W. 1128 (1907). 
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Railway Co.,52 and Chicago Great Western Railway Co. v. Zahner.53  In 
these cases, the court did not distinguish between an easement and 
a fee simple determinable, suggesting that (1) the cases themselves 
failed to raise the distinction between the two property interests, 
(2) it was not necessary for the court to make a distinction between 
the two property interests, or (3) the court had impliedly adopted a 
binary approach to deed construction. 
 Decided in 1907, Chambers addressed the question of whether 
title to land acquired in condemnation proceedings for right of way 
purposes was an easement or a fee simple determinable and held 
that the conveyance was an easement rather than a fee simple 
absolute.54  In explaining its decision, the Chambers court stated that 
the distinction between an easement and a fee simple determinable 
was immaterial to the resolution of the case because the intent of 
the grantor to create reversionary rights would be fulfilled 
regardless of whether the deed conveyed an easement or a 
defeasible fee.55 
In Norton, decided in 1915, the railroad company charged with 
having abandoned an easement defended itself on the grounds 
that it was not bound by use limitations because it had acquired a 
fee simple absolute.56  “[T]he appellants argued that the deed at 
issue ‘conveyed an absolute fee title limited only as to use, namely, 
railroad right of way purposes, and that a failure to use it for that 
purpose or at all would not terminate the absolute title thus 
granted.’”57  In Norton, the court held that the conveyance of a strip 
of land to a railroad company for a right of way conveyed an 
easement rather than an absolute title for which the appellants 
argued.58  The Norton court did not address the question of whether 
the deed constituted a fee simple determinable.59 
Zahner addressed the question of whether the grantors 
conveyed an easement or a fee estate.  In that 1920 case, the 
railroad company argued that it had acquired the land in fee and 
that the successor in title to the grantor had no right of access to a 
 
 52. 129 Minn. 126, 151 N.W. 907 (1915). 
 53. 145 Minn. 312, 177 N.W. 350 (1920). 
 54. Chambers, 100 Minn. at 219, 110 N.W. at 1129-30. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Norton, 129 Minn. at 129, 151 N.W. at 908. 
 57. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 420 (citing Norton, 129 Minn. at 129, 151 N.W. at 
908). 
 58. Id. (quoting Norton, 129 Minn. at 129, 151 N.W. at 908). 
 59. Id. 
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right of way that was conveyed outright in the granting clause.60  As 
in Norton, the Zahner court focused on the issue of reversionary 
rights in justifying its holding and stated that “[w]ithin the 
principles of our holdings there was no intent to grant a fee, but an 
intent to grant a railroad right of way easement, which would revert 
upon abandonment.”61 
Based on Chambers, Zahner, and Norton, the court in Hess could 
have endorsed a binary approach to deed construction and created 
a presumption that a deed to a railroad was an easement rather 
than a defeasible fee.  Alternatively, the court could distinguish 
these three cases from Hess on the grounds that they did not 
address or need to address the distinction between an easement 
and a defeasible fee.  The court’s choice between these alternatives 
would be influenced by the Marketable Title Act. 
D. The Marketable Title Act 
Chambers, Norton, and Zahner were decided before Minnesota’s 
MTA was enacted.  The MTA promotes finality of conveyances and 
settled expectations. It also makes the distinction between an 
easement and a fee simple determinable material because an 
interest in fee simple determinable may be subject to the MTA’s 
conclusive presumption of abandonment.62 
The stated purpose of the MTA is to prevent restrictions on 
uses that have not been reasserted as a matter of record within the 
last forty years from “fetter[ing] the marketability of real estate.”63  
It provides that no action affecting the possession or title of real 
estate may be commenced against a claim of title which has been of 
record for at least forty years unless the adverse claimant has 
recorded a notice of the adverse claim within that forty-year 
period.64  The MTA states, in part: 
As against a claim of title based upon a source of title, 
which source has then been of record at least 40 years, no 
action affecting the possession or title of any real estate 
shall be commenced . . . to enforce any right, claim, 
interest, incumbrance, or lien founded upon any 
 
 60. Chicago Great W. Ry. Co. v. Zahner, 145 Minn. 312, 312, 177 N.W. 350, 
350 (1920). 
 61. Id. at 314, 177 N.W. at 350. 
 62. MINN. STAT. § 541.023, subd. 5 (2002). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id., subd. 1. 
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instrument, event or transaction which was executed or 
occurred more than 40 years prior to the commencement 
of such action, unless within 40 years after such execution 
or occurrence there has been recorded . . . a notice . . . 
setting forth the name of the claimant, a description of 
the real estate affected and of the instrument, event or 
transaction on which such claim is founded, and stating 
whether the right, claim, interest, incumbrance, or lien is 
mature or immature.65 
 
III. THE FACTUAL BASIS OF THE PROPERTY OWNERS’ CLAIMS IN  
STATE V. HESS 
A. The 1898 Deed 
On April 1, 1898, Thomas B. Walker and his wife Harriet G. 
Walker, and W.T. Joyce and his wife Clotilde G. Joyce, conveyed a 
portion of their land to the Brainerd and Northern Minnesota 
Railway Company.66  The granting clause of the handwritten deed 
states that the grantors, 
for and in consideration of the sum of One Dollar ($1.00) 
to them in hand paid by the Brainerd and Northern 
Minnesota Railway Company . . . do hereby grant, bargain, 
sell and convey unto the said company, its successors and 
assigns, a strip, belt or piece of land, one hundred feet, 
wide, extending across the following lands in Cass and 
Hubbard Counties, State of Minnesota, described as 
follows to wit . . . .67 
Following the legal description of the lands conveyed, the 
limiting clause of the deed states: “Provided that this Grant or 
Conveyance shall continue in force so long as the said strips of land 
shall be used for Right of Way and for Railway purposes; but to 
cease and terminate if the Railway is removed from the said 
strips.”68 
In 1901, the Burlington Northern Railroad Company (BNRC) 
purchased the subject property and thus became the successor in 
title to the Brainerd and Northern Minnesota Railway Company’s 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. State v. Hess, 684 N.W.2d 414, 417 (Minn. 2004). 
 67. Brief of the State of Minnesota, through its Department of Natural 
Resources at Appendix A31, Hess, 684 N.W.2d 414. 
 68. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 417. 
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interest.69  BNRC used the corridor for a railroad line for the next 
84 years.70 
B. BNRC’s Sale of the Corridor to the State 
The Interstate Commerce Commission Act of 1920 gives the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) plenary authority to 
regulate interstate rail service.71  In general, a railroad subject to 
the jurisdiction of the ICC may only abandon a line if it obtains 
approval of the ICC.72  In determining whether to issue a certificate 
of abandonment, the ICC weighs the “public inconvenience and 
necessity” of the railway service against the financial cost to the 
railroad of operating an unprofitable corridor.73 
In 1985, BNRC received a certificate of abandonment from the 
ICC allowing discontinued service on the rail line.74  During the 
abandonment proceeding, the Minnesota Department of 
Transportation (MnDOT) petitioned the ICC for a 120-day “public 
use condition” in order to negotiate for the acquisition and 
placement of part of the rail line in the State Rail Bank Program.75  
The ICC granted the certificate of abandonment, finding that 
“portions of the right-of-way are suitable for other public 
purposes.”76  The ICC, however, denied MnDOT’s petition to 
declare part of the rail corridor “suitable for public use for 
acquisition as part of the State Rail Bank Program.”77  In doing so, 
the ICC supported its decision with the reasoning that “a ‘public 
use’ did not include keeping the track and materials intact for 
future rail freight use and that MnDOT had failed to submit the 
required information for seeking a public use condition.”78 
After the ICC granted BNRC’s request for abandonment of 
portions of the rail line, BNRC unsuccessfully attempted to sell its 
corridor for use as a tourist railway line.79  In 1986 or 1987, BNRC 
 
 69. Id. at 417-18. 
 70. Id. at 418. 
 71. Glosemeyer v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 685 F. Supp. 1108, 1113 
(E.D. Mo. 1988). 
 72. 49 U.S.C. §§ 10903, 10904 (Supp. 1991); 49 C.F.R. § 1152.50 (1990). 
 73. Id.; Vieux v. E. Bay Reg’l Park Dist., 906 F.2d 1330, 1339 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 74. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 418. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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removed the tracks, bridges, and ties from the corridor.80  In 1988, 
the Minnesota Legislature authorized the purchase of part of the 
corridor by the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) for the 
creation of the Paul Bunyan State Trail.81  BNRC then conveyed the 
corridor by quitclaim deed to the DNR for $1.526 million.82  In 
December 1991, the DNR opened the Trail for public use.83  The 
Trail extends about ninety miles from Baxter to Bemidji, 
Minnesota, and is used by tourists for hiking, biking, horseback 
riding, and snowmobiling.84 
C. The Abutting Property Owners 
The land adjoining the rail corridor changed hands a number 
of times.  In 1977, Brian and Amelia Sandberg acquired a parcel of 
land bordering the railroad corridor; the railroad line was still 
operational when the acquisition occurred.85  In 1993 and 1995, the 
Sandbergs acquired two additional parcels, one of which was 
bisected by the Trail, while the other bordered it.86 At the time of 
these acquisitions, the Trail was open for public use.87  In 1992, 
approximately one year after the Trail opened, Duwayne Hess 
acquired a parcel that is partially adjacent to and partially bisected 
by the Trail.88  Each of these landowners viewed themselves as 
successors-in-interest to the Walkers and the Joyces, the original 
grantors of the railroad right-of-way. 
In 1998, the Sandbergs and Hess blockaded portions of the 
Trail where it crossed their individual properties.89  The blockades 
prevented the public from using the Trail, forcing trail users to 
travel onto private property to get back onto the Trail, and 
necessitating a temporary re-routing of the Trail using county road 
embankments.90  The DNR received numerous complaints from 
Trail users expressing frustration with having to go around the 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id.  The Paul Bunyan State Trail purchase was authorized in Heartland 
and Paul Bunyan Trails Act, 1988 Minn. Laws ch. 679. 
 82. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 418. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
13
Wolpert: Preserving and Promoting Minnesota’s Recreational Trails: State v
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005
12WOLPERT.DOC 3/13/2005  4:27:27 PM 
1146 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:3 
blockaded portions of the Trail.91  In 2002, the Sandbergs began to 
use the Trail as a private driveway to access their property even 
though there were alternative access routes available.92  The 
Sandbergs also excavated and removed topsoil, trees, and bushes 
and stockpiled topsoil on the Trail.93 
D. Quiet Title Action 
In 2002, the DNR initiated a quiet title action seeking a 
declaration that the DNR owned the portions of the Trail being 
blockaded by the Sandbergs and Hess.94  The district court issued a 
temporary injunction “prohibiting the Sandbergs from driving 
vehicles on the [T]rail, digging in the [Trail], and using the [T]rail 
as a driveway.”95  On cross-motions for summary judgment, the 
district court determined that the DNR owned a fee simple interest 
in the disputed property in question.96  The district court found 
that the 1898 deed conveyed a fee simple determinable rather than 
an easement and that the state’s MTA extinguished the 
reversionary right.97 
E. The Court of Appeals’ Approach 
The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the railroad 
obtained an easement that had been subsequently abandoned by 
the railroad and that the Sandbergs and Hess owned the land in 
fee.98  The court began its analysis by stating that it would 
determine the intent of the parties in addressing the question of 
what property interest the 1898 deed conveyed.99 The court, 
however, did not proceed to examine the language in the deed and 
explain why the language indicated that the parties intended to 
grant an easement.100  Instead, it examined Zahner and Norton and 
then reasoned that because the supreme court had never held that 
a conveyance to a railroad was a fee interest, the intent of the 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. State v. Hess, 665 N.W.2d 560, 566 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). 
 99. Id. at 563. 
 100. Id. at 564. 
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parties to the 1898 deed must have been to grant an easement.101 
The court of appeals thus applied a presumption that a grant 
to a railroad is always an easement rather than a defeasible fee.  
The court supported this in the following manner: (1) “[w]e have 
found no Minnesota appellate cases in which right-of-way deeds to 
railroads have been construed to convey fee title;” (2) “[t]he 
primary purpose of such deeds has, rather, been determined to 
provide a right-of-way for use by the railroad during the period of 
time that the railway operated on the land subject to the 
conveyance;” and (3) “[w]e therefore conclude that the limiting 
language in the 1898 deed . . . reflects the parties’ intent that the 
deed convey an easement, rather than a fee simple determinable     
. . . .”102 
The court of appeals went on to find that the railroad 
abandoned the easement in 1986 or 1987 when it ceased railroad 
operations and removed its tracks from the corridor following 
receipt of the certificate of abandonment from the ICC.103  The 
court determined that there were three affirmative acts by the 
railroad that indicated the railroad’s intent to abandon its property 
interest: (1) the railroad sought and received a certificate of 
abandonment from the ICC in 1985 permitting discontinued 
service on the rail line between Brainerd and Bemidji; (2) the 
railroad tried unsuccessfully to sell the property for a tourist line; 
and (3) the railroad removed the tracks in 1986 or 1987.104  The 
court also stated that its decision was influenced by the fact that the 
ICC denied MnDOT’s request that the property be deemed 
suitable for public use for acquisition as part of the State Rail Bank 
Program.105  Based on these findings, the court determined that the 
Sandbergs and Hess succeeded as fee owners to the property 
before the railroad conveyed the land to the State.106  Although the 
court’s analysis of the abandonment and the shifting public use 
issues is questionable,107 it was never addressed by the Minnesota 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 566. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.  The court of appeals likely erred in its analysis of the abandonment 
issue.  Abandonment is an intent to give up the property right and is determined 
by evidence of an intent to abandon.  United Parking Stations, Inc. v. Calvary 
Temple, 257 Minn. 273, 278, 101 N.W.2d 208, 212 (1960).  Mere nonuse does not 
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indicate an intent to abandon the property right:  abandonment is shown by acts 
and conduct “clearly inconsistent with an intention to continue the use of the 
property for the purposes for which it was acquired.”  Norton v. Duluth Transfer 
Ry. Co., 129 Minn. 126, 132, 151 N.W. 907, 909 (1915).   
  There are three reasons why the court of appeals’ analysis of the 
abandonment issue is flawed.  First, the court misinterpreted the significance of an 
ICC certificate of abandonment and equated an intent to discontinue railroad 
service with an intent to abandon the property right.  The court’s confusion stems 
from the fact that the word “abandonment” has a different meaning in two 
disparate contexts.  For purposes of federal regulation of railroads, 
“abandonment” refers to the discontinuance of rail service on a particular line, as 
approved by the ICC.  For purposes of state law, “abandonment” refers to the 
relinquishment or termination of the property rights held under an easement.  
ICC approval of the discontinuance of rail service is not equivalent to 
relinquishment of the railroad’s property rights in the easement.  A railroad 
subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC may only abandon a line if it obtains the 
approval of the ICC.  49 U.S.C. §§ 10903, 10904 (Supp. 1991); 49 C.F.R. § 1152.50 
(1990).  In determining whether to issue a certificate of abandonment, the ICC 
weighs the “public convenience and necessity” of the railway service against the 
financial cost to the railroad of operating an unprofitable corridor.  49 U.S.C. § 
10903 (Supp. 1991); Vieux v. E. Bay Reg’l Park Dist., 906 F.2d 1330, 1337 (9th Cir. 
1990).  The ICC, however, issues only permission to discontinue service; an ICC 
certificate does not require the railroad to discontinue service.  Vieux, 906 F.2d at 
1339.  Accordingly, when the ICC grants a certificate of abandonment, it is simply 
determining that federal interstate commerce requirements do not necessitate 
current common carrier freight rail service on a line and is not evaluating the 
railroad’s property interest in the corridor or whether a line is abandoned for 
purposes of state property law.  Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Kmezich, 48 F.3d 1047, 
1051 (8th Cir. 1995); Vieux, 906 F.2d at 1339; Chevy Chase Land Co. v. United 
States, 733 A.2d 1055, 1085-86 (D. Md. 1999); Hennick v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 
269 S.W.2d 646, 651 (Mont. 1954); Barney v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 490 N.W.2d 
726, 731 (S.D. 1992).  Further, the ICC’s action on MnDOT’s request is irrelevant 
to the issue of state law abandonment under the facts of this case.  When a party 
requests that a corridor be designated suitable for other public use, and the ICC 
grants such a request, the sole consequence under federal law is that the railroad 
is barred from selling or disposing of the property during the 180-day period.  49 
U.S.C. § 10906 (Supp. 1982).  For these reasons, the court of appeals was incorrect 
in viewing the certificate of abandonment and the denial of MnDOT’s request as 
indicators of abandonment. 
  Second, the court of appeals considered the railroad’s attempted sale for 
a tourist line and the removal of the tracks as indicators of abandonment in direct 
contravention to existing precedent.  See Wash. Wildlife Pres., Inc. v. Minnesota, 
329 N.W.2d 543, 547 (Minn. 1983) (abandonment of a corridor as a railroad right 
of way does not effect abandonment of the easement; removal of the tracks and 
termination of service are consistent with use of the railroad bed as a public 
recreational trail); Crolley v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co., 30 Minn. 541, 545, 
16 N.W. 422, 424 (1883) (sale of easement is not equivalent to an abandonment 
when the sale is for continued use of the property as a right of way). 
  Third, the court of appeals misapplied the shifting public use doctrine.  
Under Minnesota’s shifting public use doctrine, recreational trail use is 
compatible and consistent with an easement’s prior use as a rail line and imposes 
no additional burden on the servient estate.  Wash. Wildlife, 329 N.W.2d at 545-46.  
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Supreme Court because that court determined that the grantors 
 
In Washington Wildlife, thirteen of the fourteen deeds at issue conveyed fee simple 
absolute estates and one deed created an easement.  The court analyzed whether 
the new use as a recreational trail was within the scope of the prior use.  Id. at 547-
48.  Because the deeds contained no limiting language, the supreme court had to 
assume for purposes of its analysis of the abandonment question that the deeds 
conveyed easements and also to assume what limiting language the deeds 
contained.  Wash. Wildlife, 329 N.W.2d at 546.  The court framed the question 
based on the assumption that the deeds contained language limiting use of the 
land for railroad purposes based on the fact that the land had been used for 
railroad purposes.  Id. at 547.  The court, however, emphasized that it was only 
assuming that the deeds conveyed easements, and was careful to indicate that the 
deeds did not appear to be easements because they did not contain any limiting 
language.  Id. at 546.  The court stated: 
It is assumed that the deeds conveyed only an easement.  Significantly, 
however, none of the deeds expressly limit the easement to railroad 
purposes, provide that the interest conveyed terminates if use for railroad 
purposes ceases, or provide that the easement would exist only for so 
long as the right-of-way was used for railroad purposes.  While the 
grantors were undoubtedly aware that a railroad would be constructed on 
the land, none of the deeds limit the use to railroad purposes. 
Id.   
  The court of appeals in Hess, however, seized upon the above passage in 
Washington Wildlife and used that language to distinguish the 1898 deed from the 
Washington Wildlife deeds.  Hess, 665 N.W.2d at 565-66.  The court reasoned that 
the 1898 deed was unlike the deeds at issue in Washington Wildlife because the 1898 
deed contained language limiting the use of the land to railroad purposes until 
removal of the railway from the strips, while the Washington Wildlife deeds did not.  
Id.  However, this passage relied on by the court of appeals in Hess does not 
indicate that the supreme court in Washington Wildlife was basing its conclusion 
regarding abandonment on the fact that the deeds did not contain limiting 
language.  The deeds did not contain limiting language because they conveyed fee 
estates and the supreme court had to assume for purposes of analysis that the 
deeds did contain language limiting land use to railroad purposes.  Accordingly, 
the court of appeals had no basis for distinguishing the 1898 deed from the 
Washington Wildlife deeds.  The 1898 deed expressly limits use to railroad purposes 
and the deeds at issue in Washington Wildlife were assumed to contain language 
limiting use to railroad purposes.  Indeed, there would have been no need for the 
court in Washington Wildlife to address the question whether the scope of the 
easements could accommodate a shift in public use unless the easements were 
assumed to be specifically limited to railroad use.  If it were assumed that the 
easements were broad transportation easements, the supreme court would not 
have needed to resort to the shifting public use doctrine because trail use would 
be considered within the scope of such an easement.  Thus, the 1898 deed 
contains the same limiting language as assumed in the Washington Wildlife deeds.  
Under Washington Wildlife, a railroad does not abandon a public easement if the 
property is transformed to meet changing needs but retains some character of the 
original easement.  Wash. Wildlife, 329 N.W.2d at 547.  Accordingly, the Paul 
Bunyan State Trail, a recreational trail, is compatible and consistent with the 
corridor’s prior use as a rail line and the court of appeals in Hess erred in 
concluding otherwise. 
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conveyed a fee estate to the railroad rather than an easement. 
IV. THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT’S ANALYSIS 
The main question before the supreme court was whether the 
1898 deed to the railroad company conveyed a fee simple 
determinable or an easement.108  The court began its analysis by 
examining prior case law addressing the nature and scope of a 
conveyance to a railroad.109  The court also discussed the MTA, its 
underlying policy objectives, and its significance for analyzing the 
1898 deed.110  Against the backdrop of previous case law and the 
MTA, the court then analyzed the intent of the parties in the 1898 
deed.  The court concluded that the language of the deed and 
extrinsic evidence indicated that the grantors conveyed a fee 
simple determinable estate to the railroad.111  The court also 
concluded that the possibility of reverter was extinguished under 
the MTA.112  The court therefore reversed the court of appeals and 
held that the district court was correct in granting summary 
judgment for the DNR because as a matter of law, the DNR now 
owned the subject property in fee simple absolute.113 
A. Conveyances to Railroads: Chambers, Norton, Zahner, and the 
MTA 
The court identified three cases involving the conveyance of a 
strip of land to a railroad company: Chambers,114 Norton,115 and 
Zahner.116  Relying on Chambers, the court concluded that Norton and 
Zahner “provide[d] limited guidance . . . in determining whether 
the interest conveyed by the 1898 Walker/Joyce deed was an 
easement or a fee simple determinable.”117  This conclusion was 
crucial to the court’s ultimate holding for several reasons.  First, it 
swept away the foundations for the court of appeals’ conclusion 
that there was a presumption that a conveyance to a railroad was an 
 
 108. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 419-20. 
 109. Id. at 420-21. 
 110. Id. at 422-23. 
 111. Id. at 426-27. 
 112. Id. at 426-27. 
 113. Id. at 427. 
 114. Chambers v. Great N. Power Co., 100 Minn. 214, 110 N.W. 1128 (1907). 
 115. Norton v. Duluth Transfer Ry. Co., 129 Minn. 126, 151 N.W. 907 (1915). 
 116. Chi. Great W. Ry. Co. v. Zahner, 145 Minn. 312, 177 N.W. 350 (1920). 
 117. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 421. 
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easement rather than a defeasible fee.  Second, it freed the court 
from the binary analytical structure of the nineteenth century and 
its underlying anti-railroad animus in a manner consistent with the 
public policy objectives of the MTA.  Finally, it permitted the court 
to evaluate the nature of the interest conveyed to the railroad 
company based on its longstanding approach that the intent of the 
grantor determines the nature and scope of the property interest 
conveyed.118 
In Chambers, the question before the court was whether title to 
land acquired in condemnation proceedings for right of way 
purposes was an easement or a fee simple determinable.  The court 
held that the conveyance was an easement rather than a fee simple 
absolute.119  In explaining its decision, however, the Chambers court 
stated that the distinction between an easement and a fee simple 
determinable was immaterial to the resolution of the case because 
the intent of the grantor to create reversionary rights would be 
fulfilled regardless of whether the deed conveyed an easement or a 
defeasible fee.120  The court stated: 
It . . . becomes immaterial whether the title [to a railroad 
right of way] amounted to a mere easement, or a qualified 
or terminable fee.  Whatever the nature of the title, it 
would terminate whenever the company failed to perform 
the very function which it was created to perform, viz., 
operate a railroad over the land.121 
The Hess court quoted the above passage from Chambers and 
observed that the Chambers court “recognized . . . that the 
distinction between an easement and a fee simple determinable 
was immaterial to the resolution of the case”122 because “the 
interests at issue would have reverted to the grantors upon the 
termination of their use regardless of the distinction.”123  The court 
in Hess also acknowledged that courts in the nineteenth century 
often failed to make fine distinctions among the various property 
rights that the railroads could acquire because anti-railroad animus 
caused many courts to hold that all ambiguities in deeds were to be 
 
 118. See id. 
 119. Chambers, 100 Minn. at 219, 110 N.W. at 1129-30. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 420. 
 123. Id. at 421. 
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resolved in favor of the grantor landowners.124  As a result, the 
courts in this period tended to impose a “binary structure on 
railroad title disputes,” either holding that the railroad acquired a 
fee simple absolute and could do virtually anything it wanted with 
its land or that the railroad acquired an easement extinguishable 
under principles of abandonment.125 
Chambers’ observation that the property would revert 
automatically to the grantor regardless of whether the deed created 
an easement or a defeasible fee, coupled with the tendency of 
courts in this era to construe deeds to railroads as either conveying 
a fee simple absolute or an easement, led the Hess court to closely 
scrutinize the questions addressed in Norton and Zahner.  Although 
the deeds at issue in Norton and Zahner appeared to be factually 
similar to the deed in Hess, the court recognized that these 
decisions would have limited precedential value in determining the 
nature of the property interest conveyed to the railroad company 
by the 1898 deed if the decisions followed the binary approach 
typical of nineteenth century courts or failed to address whether 
the deed at issue conveyed a defeasible fee or an easement.126 
The court in Hess determined that the question in both Zahner 
and Norton was whether the deed to the railroad company granted 
a fee simple absolute or an easement.127  In Norton, the railroad 
company charged with having abandoned an easement defended 
itself on the grounds that it was not bound by use limitations 
because it had acquired a fee simple absolute.128  “[T]he appellants 
argued that the deed at issue ‘conveyed an absolute fee title limited 
only as to use, namely, railroad right of way purposes, and that a 
failure to use it for that purpose or at all would not terminate the 
absolute title thus granted.’”129  In Norton, the court held that the 
conveyance of a strip of land to a railroad company for a right of 
way conveyed an easement rather than an absolute title for which 
the appellants argued.130  The Norton court did not address whether 
 
 124. Id. at 421 n.6. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 420-21 & n.6. 
 127. Id. at 420-21 (citing Norton, 129 Minn. at 129-31, 151 N.W. at 908; Zahner, 
145 Minn. at 313, 177 N.W. at 350). 
 128. Norton, 129 Minn. at 129, 151 N.W. at 908. 
 129. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 420 (citing Norton, 129 Minn. at 129, 151 N.W. at 
908). 
 130. Id. (quoting Norton, 129 Minn. at 129, 151 N.W. at 908). 
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the deed constituted a fee simple determinable.131  The court stated 
that its holding meant that “intentional abandonment of the 
property operates to extinguish all rights of the grantee without 
affirmative action on the part of the grantor.”132 The Hess court 
explained, based on Chambers, that the distinction between an 
easement and a fee simple determinable was not material to the 
case since under both scenarios, abandonment would extinguish 
the grantee’s interest in the right-of-way.133 
Similarly, Zahner addressed the question of whether the 
grantors conveyed an easement or a fee estate.  The railroad 
company argued that it had acquired the land in fee and that the 
successor in title to the grantor had no right of access to a right of 
way that was conveyed outright in the granting clause.134  As in 
Norton, the Zahner court focused on the issue of reversionary rights 
in justifying its holding and stated that “[w]ithin the principles of 
our holdings there was no intent to grant a fee, but an intent to 
grant a railroad right of way easement, which would revert upon 
abandonment.”135  The court in Hess explained that Zahner 
addressed the question of whether the deed conveyed an easement 
or a fee simple absolute and that the determinable fee option was 
not addressed.136  Furthermore, the court explained, based on 
Chambers, that the distinction between an easement and a fee 
simple determinable was not material to the resolution of the 
case.137 
 After discussing the precedential value of Norton and Zahner, 
the Hess court went on to discuss the implications of the MTA for 
its methodology of deed construction.138  The MTA provides that 
no action affecting the possession or title of real estate may be 
commenced against a claim of title that has been of record for at 
least forty years unless the adverse claimant has recorded a notice 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Norton, 129 Minn. at 131, 151 N.W. at 908. 
 133. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 421 (“As we had recognized in Chambers, the interests 
at issue would have reverted to the grantors upon the termination of their use 
regardless of the distinction.”). 
 134. Chicago Great W. Ry. Co. v. Zahner, 145 Minn. 312, 312, 177 N.W. 350, 
350 (1920). 
 135. Id. at 314, 177 N.W. at 350. 
 136. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 420-21 & n.6. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 422. 
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of the adverse claim within that forty-year period.139  In Hess, the 
court recognized that the stated purpose of the MTA is “to prevent 
restrictions on uses that have not been reasserted as a matter of 
record within the last 40 years from ‘fetter[ing] the marketability of 
title.’”140  The court also stated that two of its previous decisions 
recognized that the passage of the MTA was “‘a marked departure 
from the policy and operation underlying our land transfer 
system’”141 and represented “‘a new point of departure for the 
process of judicial reasoning’ in real estate law.”142 
The court in Hess then explained that there were two reasons 
why the MTA was significant for its analysis of the nature of the 
interest conveyed by the 1898 deed.143  First, the MTA now makes 
the distinction between an easement and a fee simple determinable 
material because an interest in fee simple determinable may be 
subject to the MTA’s conclusive presumption of abandonment.144  
Second, the court stated that “public policy reasons behind the 
[MTA], such as finality of conveyances and enforcing settled 
expectations, should be considered in our framework for analyzing 
the intent of the parties in a conveyance of land for right of way 
purposes in a deed.”145  In a footnote, the court further elaborated 
on the public policy interests that underlie the MTA by quoting 
extensively from a law review article by Wright and Hestor.146  In 
those passages, Wright and Hestor explain that the pubic has an 
interest in settled expectations and an interest in preserving 
corridors for trails and utilities.147  Both of those interests are served 
by finding fee title in the railroad and by abandoning common law 
doctrines that narrow the scope of interests in railroad corridors.148  
According to Wright and Hestor, such an approach would further 
the pubic policy of quieting title that underlies various property 
doctrines and would be consistent with the expectation of 
 
 139. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 541.023, subd. 1 (2002)). 
 140. Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 541.023, subd. 5 (2002)). 
 141. Id. (quoting Hersh Props., LLC v. McDonald’s Corp., 588 N.W.2d 728, 
734 (Minn. 1999)). 
 142. Id. (quoting Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 99, 83 N.W.2d 800, 812 
(1957)). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at n.7 (quoting Wright & Hester, supra note 38, at 384-85). 
 147. Id. at 422. 
 148. Id. 
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adjoining property owners that they not receive the windfall of a 
rail corridor.149  In short, it is in the public interest to abandon the 
century-old anti-railroad animus.150 
The Hess court’s conclusion that Norton and Zahner provided 
limited guidance in evaluating the 1898 deed was crucial to its 
ultimate holding for three reasons.  First, it swept away the 
foundations for the court of appeals’ conclusion that there was a 
presumption that a conveyance to a railroad was an easement 
rather than a defeasible fee.151  The court of appeals had reviewed 
Norton and Zahner and concluded that because the Minnesota 
courts had never held that a conveyance to a railroad company was 
a fee estate, the parties to the 1898 deed intended to convey an 
easement.152  This presumption, however, conflicted with the 
supreme court’s longstanding rule that the intent of the grantor 
determines that nature of the interest conveyed.153  The supreme 
court, by recognizing that the courts in Norton and Zahner were 
evaluating whether the estate conveyed was an easement or a fee 
simple absolute and that the distinction between a fee simple 
determinable and an easement was not material to the outcome of 
these cases, effectively distinguished Norton and Zahner from Hess 
and, at the same time, exposed the court’s binary approach to deed 
construction. 
Second, the Hess court concluded that Norton and Zahner were 
of limited precedential value in evaluating the nature of the 
interest conveyed by the 1898 deed, which freed the court from the 
binary analytical structure of the nineteenth century and its 
underlying anti-railroad animus in a manner consistent with the 
public policy objectives of the MTA.  The binary approach to deed 
construction reflected not only an anti-railroad animus, but the 
doctrinal reality that the distinction between an easement and a fee 
simple determinable was immaterial in giving effect to reversionary 
rights.154  Once the MTA had been enacted, however, the Hess court 
recognized that the distinction between an easement and a fee 
simple determinable was now legally significant and that the stated 
public policy objectives underlying the MTA were not served by 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 424 & n.8. 
 152. State v. Hess, 665 N.W.2d 560, 566 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). 
 153. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 428-29. 
 154. See Wright & Hester, supra note 38, at 384-85. 
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continuing to interpret deeds in a manner that reflected the 
nineteenth century’s anti-railroad animus.155  Indeed, the court 
understood that finding fee title in the railroad would further the 
MTA’s public policy of quieting title when there was little 
“expectation on the part of the adjoining landowners to receive the 
windfall of a rail corridor.”156  The court also understood that there 
was no reason to continue the anti-railroad animus because finding 
fee title in the railroad furthers the public interest in preserving 
corridors for trails and utilities when landowners do not have title 
to the corridor land, heirs of the grantor are long gone, and the 
corridor can continue to “provide vital public utility, recreational, 
environmental, and transportation services.”157  By exposing the 
doctrinal and historical underpinnings of Norton and Zahner and 
contrasting them with the modern doctrinal and policy objectives 
of the MTA, the court provided a compelling normative 
justification for jettisoning Norton and Zahner’s binary structure and 
fully restoring its longstanding methodology for interpreting deeds 
based on the grantor’s intent. 
Third, the Hess court’s conclusion that Norton and Zahner were 
of limited precedent permitted the court to evaluate the nature of 
the interest conveyed to the railroad company based on its 
longstanding approach that the intent of the grantors determines 
the nature and scope of the property interest conveyed.  Indeed, 
on numerous occasions the supreme court has stated that one 
examines “the intent of the grantor, as expressed in the deed and 
in light of the surrounding circumstances” in determining the 
nature and scope of a conveyance.158  In both Norton and Zahner, 
the court stated that it would examine the intent of the parties as 
expressed in the deed to evaluate whether the grantor conveyed a 
fee interest or an easement.159  Based on Hess, however, it is 
apparent that the court believed that the intent of the grantor was 
being evaluated under the confines of a legal doctrine and 
historical animus towards railroads.  Thus, the court in Hess 
established an approach to deed construction that removed the 
 
 155. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 422. 
 156. Id. at 422 n.7 (quoting Wright & Hester, supra note 38, at 385-86). 
 157. Id. (quoting Wright & Hester, supra note 38, at 385-86). 
 158. Id. at 423 (citing Consol. School Dist. No. 102 v. Walter, 243 Minn. 159, 
162, 66 N.W.2d 881, 883 (1954)). 
 159. Chi. Great W. Ry. Co. v. Zahner, 145 Minn. 312, 313-14, 177 N.W. 350, 
350 (1920); Norton v. Duluth Transfer Ry. Co., 129 Minn. 126, 130-31, 151 N.W. 
907, 908 (1915). 
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constraints of the ancient legal doctrine and historical animus. 
B. The Parties’ Intent 
Against the backdrop of the MTA and its prior cases, the court 
evaluated the nature of the interest conveyed to the railroad 
company by examining the language of the deed to discern the 
intent of the parties.160  The court noted that its construction would 
be based on the entire deed rather than disjointed parts and that if 
the deed’s language were ambiguous, it could consider evidence of 
the surrounding circumstances and the situation of the parties to 
shed light on the intent of the parties.161 
To determine the intent of the parties, the court then 
examined the language of the granting clause, the use of the terms 
“so long as” and “right of way” in the habendum clause, the 
provision granting the railroad company permission to erect snow 
fences, and the release of dower rights.162  Because the deed was 
ambiguous on the intent of the parties, the court also examined 
extrinsic evidence.163  Based on all of these factors, the court 
concluded that the parties intended to convey a fee simple 
determinable rather than an easement.164 
In doing so, the court first turned to the language of the 
granting clause, which states that the grantors “hereby grant, 
bargain, sell and convey unto the said company, its successors and 
assigns, a strip, belt or piece of land.”165  The court determined that 
the granting clause “expressly conveys land rather than mere use of 
the land.”166 
The court then turned to the language of the habendum 
clause, which states: “Provided that this Grant or Conveyance shall 
continue in force, so long as the said strips of land shall be used for 
Right of Way and for Railway purposes; but to cease and terminate 
if the Railway is removed from the said strips.”167  The court 
 
 160. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 423. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 424. 
 163. Id. at 425-26. 
 164. Id. at 426. 
 165. Id. at 423. 
 166. Id.  The granting clause of the 1898 deed expressly transfers an interest in 
land and does not include the term “right of way.”  The granting clause generally 
controls the determination of whether a fee title or easement is granted.  See 
Korpela, supra note 18, § 5(c) at  973. 
 167. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 423. 
25
Wolpert: Preserving and Promoting Minnesota’s Recreational Trails: State v
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005
12WOLPERT.DOC 3/13/2005  4:27:27 PM 
1158 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:3 
determined “that the use of the phrase ‘so long as’ in the clause 
provides clear evidence of the grantors’ intent to convey a 
determinable fee because this phrase is typically used in a 
conveyance of a fee simple determinable.”168 
The court also determined that the use of the term “right of 
way” in the habendum clause did not provide evidence of the 
parties’ intent as to the nature of the conveyance because the term 
“right of way” has a dual meaning and because Minnesota law does 
not presume that a conveyance of land to a railroad company for 
“right of way” purposes is an easement.169  The court first observed 
that courts have long recognized that the term “right of way” is 
ambiguous because it may be used to describe (1) “a right of 
passage over any tract,” suggesting an easement, or (2) the “land 
which railroad companies take upon which to construct their road-
bed, suggesting conveyance of a fee interest.”170  Accordingly, the 
use of the term “right of way” does not necessarily mean that the 
conveyance is an easement.171  The court then concluded that this 
understanding of the dual nature of the term “right of way” is 
consistent with Minnesota law, particularly the MTA, which 
disfavors encumbrances on title.172  In light of the MTA, the court 
 
 168. Id. at 424.  Construction of the deed as a fee would give effect to the 
defeasance clause in the habendum clause. If the deed intended to convey an 
easement, no reversionary clause would be necessary because the abandonment of 
the easement would automatically extinguish the easement even if the deed 
contained no reversionary clause. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. (citing Bosell v. Rannestad, 226 Minn. 413, 418, 33 N.W.2d 40, 43-44 
(1948)).  Other courts have recognized the two meanings of “right of way” and 
have concluded that the mere presence of the term “right of way” in a deed does 
not by itself indicate an intent to convey an easement.  See, e.g., King County v. 
Rasmussen, 299 F.3d 1077, 1085 (9th Cir. 2002); Clark v. CSX Transp., Inc., 737 
N.E.2d 752, 758 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Brown v. State, 924 P.2d 908, 914 (Wash. 
1996) (en banc).  In addition, the fact that the term “right of way” is used in the 
habendum clause does not mean that an easement was conveyed.  In general, the 
habendum clause “may explain, enlarge, or qualify, but cannot contradict or 
defeat, the estate granted” in the granting clause.  N.Y. Indians v. United States, 
170 U.S. 1, 20 (1898). 
 171. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 424. 
 172. Id. Such a construction of the term “right of way” carries out the 
underlying purpose of the MTA that outmoded restrictions on use that have not 
been reasserted as a matter of record within the last forty years “not fetter the 
marketability of real estate.”  MINN. STAT. § 541.023, subd. 5 (2002).  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that this express legislative policy “should be 
accepted as a new point of departure for the process of judicial reasoning.”  
Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 98, 83 N.W.2d 800, 812 (1957). 
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then stated that “[t]o the extent that Norton and Zahner could be 
read to suggest that any conveyance of a right of way to a railroad is 
an easement, they are no longer good law.”173  For all these reasons, 
the court concluded that the use of the term “right of way” in the 
habendum clause did not necessarily make the conveyance an 
easement.174 
Next, the court described additional language in the 1898 
deed that indicated the grantors’ intent to convey a fee simple 
determinable.175  The court highlighted language in the deed 
conveying the 100-foot-wide corridor and separate language 
describing the conveyance of four additional strips of land that 
increase the width of the corridor up to 200 feet.176  The court 
observed that the deed uses different language for the grant of the 
corridor and the grant of an easement to the railroad company to 
erect snow fences up to 100 feet beyond the edges of the 
corridor.177  The language regarding the snow fences used the term 
“right” as opposed to the phrase “grant, bargain, sell and convey.”178  
Based on this different language used by the parties for the grant of 
the corridor and the grant of the easement for snow fences, the 
court concluded that the parties were aware of the distinction 
between the conveyance of an easement and a fee simple 
determinable and intended to convey an ownership interest in the 
land rather than mere use of the land.179 
The court then pointed to additional language in the 1898 
deed that shed light on the intent of the parties to convey a fee 
estate: the deed contained a release of dower rights.180  “‘Dower 
rights’ are an interest that a wife has in the real estate of her 
husband.”181  The release provides: “And the said Harriet G. Walker 
and Hattie F. Akeley hereby relinquish their right of dower in the 
tracts hereby conveyed.”182 
An easement is not title to the land and can be conveyed 
 
 173. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 424 n.8. 
 174. Id. at 425. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. (citing Stitt v. Smith, 102 Minn. 253, 254, 113 N.W. 632, 633 (1907)). 
 182. Id. at 417.  According to the court, the words “Hattie F. Akeley” and 
“relinquish” were illegible.  Id. n.2. 
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without the relinquishment of the wife’s dower rights.183  The court 
noted that the presence in a deed to a railroad of language 
releasing dower rights, while not dispositive, provides evidence of 
an intent to convey a fee interest rather than an easement.184 
Finally, the court noted that because the 1898 deed was 
ambiguous about the intent of the parties regarding the nature of 
the interest conveyed, it could look to extrinsic evidence of the 
surrounding circumstances of the parties in relation to the 
conveyance, such as the subsequent conduct of the parties.185  On 
June 17, 1901, W.T. Joyce and Clotilde G. Joyce, grantors of the 
1898 deed, conveyed by deed their interest in certain land adjacent 
to the railway corridor created by the 1898 deed.186  The 1901 deed 
to Akeley described the land conveyed and then provided: 
“Excepting and reserving there from the land heretobefore 
conveyed to the Park Rapids and Leech Lake Railway and to the 
Brainerd and Northern Minnesota Railway for right-of-way.” 187 
When the term “excepting” is used in a deed, it typically 
indicates that nothing passes.188  A conveyance referring to a 
preexisting easement typically indicates that the conveyance is 
“subject to” the easement.189  Accordingly, the court concluded that 
the 1901 deed provided additional support that the parties to the 
1898 deed intended to convey a fee simple determinable rather 
than an easement.190 
In sum, the court concluded that the language of the granting 
clause, the use of the terms “so long as” in the habendum clause, 
the provision granting the railroad company permission to erect 
snow fences, the release of dower rights, and the language of the 
 
 183. Id. at 425 (citing Chicago & S.W. R.R. Co. v. Swinney, 38 Iowa 182, 182 
(1874); 28 C.J.S. Dower and Curtesy § 12 (1996)). 
 184. Id.; see also Brewer & Taylor Co. v. Wall, 769 S.W.2d 753, 755 (Ark. 1989); 
Coleman v. Mo. Pac. R.R.  Co., 745 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Ark. 1988); Elton Schmidt & 
Sons Farm Co. v. Kneib, 507 N.W.2d 305, 309 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993).  But see Hawk 
v. Rice, 325 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Iowa 1982) (holding that granting clause indicated 
conveyance of easement despite the release of dower in the deed). 
 185. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 425-26. 
 186. Id. at 426. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. (citing Carlson v. Duluth Short Line Ry. Co., 38 Minn. 305, 306, 37 
N.W. 341, 341 (1888)); see also King County v. Rasmussen, 299 F.3d 1077, 1087 
(9th Cir. 2002) (“By excepting the right of way . . . the [subsequent] conveyances 
betray an understanding that the Railway owned the strip of land and did not 
merely have a right to enter the strip.”). 
 189. Hess, 684 N.W.2d at 426. 
 190. Id. 
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1901 deed all indicated that the parties intended to convey a fee 
simple determinable.191  The court noted that this conclusion “best 
serves many of the policy reasons underlying the [MTA].”192  
Because the railroad acquired a fee simple determinable in the 
1898 deed, the grantors retained only the possibility of a reverter.193  
The court went on to hold, however, that this future interest was 
extinguished under the MTA because it was not periodically 
recorded by the grantors’ successors.194  Accordingly, the railroad’s 
defeasible fee interest had long ago ripened into a fee simple 
absolute and the state owned the land in fee simple absolute.195 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Hess, the Minnesota Supreme Court followed the public 
policy objectives of the legislature in the MTA and (1) refused to 
create a presumption that a conveyance of a right of way to a 
railroad company is an easement rather than a defeasible fee and 
(2) extricated itself from prior case law that reflected an anti-
railroad animus and a binary structure of deed interpretation.196  In 
doing so, the court fully embraced its longstanding methodology of 
deed interpretation that the intent of the parties determines the 
nature of the conveyance and established a strong legal and policy 
foundation protecting the past and future conversion of rail 
corridors into recreational trails.197  The court’s decision in Hess 
means that future challenges to recreational trails owned by the 
state cannot rely on a presumption that the original conveyance 
was an easement.  Rather, abutting property owners will have to 
demonstrate that the parties to an ancient deed intended to convey 
an easement in order to challenge a rails-to-trails conversion.  Hess 
is a clear signal to trail opponents that Minnesota’s public interest 
supports interpreting deeds to railroads as conveying fee estates 
rather than easements.  For all these reasons, Hess reassures the 
state that it owns its recreational trails, promotes the public 
interest, and avoids plunging the state into a costly parcel by parcel 
battle to save its recreational trails. 
 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 427. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 424. 
 197. Id. 
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